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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper is a product of the Independent Evaluation Group, the Poverty and Equity Global Practice Group, as well as 
the German Development Institute and KU Leuven. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access 
to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The corresponding author may be contacted at  zbogetic@
worldbank.org. 
The adoption of the shared prosperity goal by the World 
Bank in 2013 and Sustainable Development Goal 10, 
on inequality, by the United Nations in 2015 should 
strengthen the focus of development interventions and 
cooperation on the income growth of the bottom 40 per-
cent of the income distribution (the bottom 40). However, 
little is known about within-country allocation patterns 
among the projects of development institutions. This paper 
proposes a new geographic targeting indicator and related 
methodology to assess the within-country aid allocations 
of donors by correlating the distribution of funding within 
countries with the geographical distribution of the bottom 
40. Applying this methodology to World Bank funding
for projects approved over 2005–14 shows that, of the 58
countries in the sample, 42 exhibit a positive correlation
between the shares of the bottom 40 and World Bank
funding, and, in almost half of these, the correlation is 
above 0.5. Slightly more than a quarter of the countries, 
mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative correlation. 
The presence of the bottom 40 is typically correlated with 
the population size of an administrative area. A regression 
analysis shows that, controlling for population, the cor-
relation between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding 
switches sign and becomes significant and negative on 
average. This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa, 
because the correlation is insignificant in the rest of the 
world regions. Hence, the significant and positive correla-
tion in the estimations without controlling for population 
suggests that World Bank project funding is concentrated 
in administrative areas in which more people live (including 
the bottom 40) rather than in poorer administrative areas.
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1. Introduction1 
The World Bank established overarching twin goals in 2013: ending poverty by 2030 and sharing 
prosperity. At the core of the Bank’s mandate, the first goal is focused on the reduction of global 
extreme poverty from 10.7 percent in 2013 to 3 percent by 2030, based on the international poverty 
line of $1.90 per person in 2011 purchasing power parity U.S. dollars. The second goal is a new one. Its 
basic metric is growth in the real incomes of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution of the 
population (the bottom 40) in each country.2 While the first is a global goal, the second is country-
specific. These twin goals are part of a wider international development agenda and are intimately 
related to United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 1 and 10, respectively, which have been 
adopted by the global community.3 
The adoption of the shared prosperity goal of the World Bank or the United Nations goal of reducing 
inequality should strengthen the focus of development interventions and cooperation in seeking 
income growth among the bottom 40 and narrowing the gap between this growth and the growth in 
the mean of the income distribution. The latter, which coincides with Sustainable Development Goal 
10, is defined as the shared prosperity premium, and it provides insights into changes in inequality over 
time (Lakner, Negre, and Prydz 2014; World Bank 2016). Evaluating and monitoring these changes will 
thus be a key component of both World Bank operations and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development.4 
Even though the World Bank’s second goal is nominally new, the Bank has been pursuing broader 
distributional objectives through initiatives aiming at pro-poor growth, inclusive growth, and equity for 
a long time. Because of limitations in spatial distributional data, however, little is known about 
geographical allocation patterns among the institution’s projects within countries. The same holds for 
other bilateral and multilateral development actors. Nonetheless, because of the increased availability 
of disaggregated spatial data, measuring and analyzing the subnational distribution of project funding 
and its relationship to the bottom 40 are now easier. Reaching such an understanding of funding can 
dramatically improve efficiency and help maximize the poverty-reducing effects of development 
programs (Elbers et al. 2007; Karlan and Thuysbaert 2016). 
This paper aims to contribute to an incipient literature examining the subnational allocation of 
development intervention funding. In particular, it investigates whether investment projects of the 
World Bank’s two lending arms, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for 
middle-income countries and the International Development Association for low-income countries, 
flow to administrative areas where the bottom 40 are located.5 The paper accomplishes this by (1) 
                                                            
1 The authors wish to express gratitude for helpful discussions and comments from Steve Knack, Minh Cong 
Nguyen, Jose Montes, Stephan Klingebiel, Auguste Kouame, Pablo Fajnzylber, Joao Pedro Azevedo, and also for 
research assistance from Mira Franzen and Claudia Witkowski. We are also grateful to Massimo Mastruzzi and 
the World Bank’s BOOST team, Dimitry Zaviralov, and the World Bank’s Geospatial Support Team (GOST) for 
their advice and support.  
2 Income here generally refers to income or consumption aggregates obtained through surveys. 
3 See “Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform: Sustainable Development Goals,” Division for Sustainable 
Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300. 
4 See “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,“ Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, United Nations, New York, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld. 
5 Investment projects are the dominant type of assistance across development institutions, including the World 
Bank. The other two types are budget support loans (or development policy lending in the current parlance of 
the Bank), which constitute, on average, about 25 percent of the World Bank’s yearly lending portfolio, and 
Program-for-Results financing, which has been negligible until recent years. The analysis in this paper is focused 
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merging unique geospatial data sets on the subnational distribution of World Bank investment projects 
and the population identified as the bottom 40 and (2) correlating the two variables. 
A relatively high correlation would be consistent with effective geographic targeting insofar as most 
resources are directed toward areas with a high presence of the bottom 40.6 However, the presence 
of the bottom 40 is typically correlated with population size in the areas. Hence, a high correlation may 
be indicative only that World Bank project funding is concentrated in populous administrative areas 
rather than explicitly targeting the bottom 40. Likewise, a low positive correlation or even a negative 
correlation may not necessarily point to poor targeting because there are many other factors 
potentially affecting the allocation of aid. The paper accounts for some of these effects through the 
use of control variables in a regression analysis. It does not account, nonetheless, for general 
equilibrium effects, that is, that different aid allocation patterns within countries may have different 
effects on economic co-benefits such as higher growth, market and energy access, for example. 
The correlation analysis indicates that, of the 58 countries in the sample, 42 show a positive correlation 
between the shares of the bottom 40 and World Bank funding, and almost half of these show a 
correlation at above 0.5. Of the total sample, slightly more than a quarter of the countries, mostly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative correlation. 
The regression analysis shows that, once one controls for population, the correlation between the 
bottom 40 and World Bank funding switches sign and becomes significant and negative on average. 
This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa because the correlation is insignificant for the rest of the 
world regions. Hence, the significant and positive correlation in the estimations without controlling for 
population is indicative that World Bank project funding is concentrated in areas where there are more 
people, including the bottom 40, rather than in poorer areas. 
Section 2 discusses how this paper fits within and contributes to the academic debate on the allocation 
of aid. A number of factors that may affect the within-country allocation of aid are also addressed in 
the section. Section 3 discusses methodology and data, while section 4 presents the results. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Background and context 
Donors generally tend to allocate funds across countries following a number of more or less explicit 
criteria. Within countries, however, little has been produced in the literature on how donor resources 
are allocated. Nonetheless, because poverty reduction is one of the criteria often at the top of donor-
stated priorities, the geographical distribution of the projects and programs within countries may be 
expected to bear a positive correlation with the physical location of the poor in both absolute numbers 
and relative terms, that is, the share and number of the poor in the population of an administrative 
area.7 
                                                            
on the traditional and still dominant form of development assistance, investment projects. See below for details 
on the reason why the paper does not consider budget support lending. 
6 Literally targeting the poorest would specifically require the poverty gap or a higher order poverty function to 
be used as the main allocation criterion, whereas targeting the bottom 40 focuses on the poorest 40 percent in 
a society, but does not ensure a specific focus on the poorest among the bottom 40 or even all the poor if the 
bottom 40 fails to encompass all the poor of a society. 
7 This paper spotlights the bottom 40, who are the focus of the World Bank’s second corporate goal. It thus 
follows the specific, albeit somewhat arbitrary choice made by the World Bank and the international community 
(in target 1 of Sustainable Development Goal 10) that growth in the incomes of the bottom 40 is particularly 
relevant for the overall economic growth and welfare of societies. 
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The few studies that exist on the within-country targeting of aid are mostly limited to one particular 
country at a time (De and Becker 2015; Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Sosa Andrés 2017; Odokonyero et al. 
2015). Briggs (2017) and Öhler and Nunnenkamp (2014) are exceptions: the latter use different 
development indicators—infant mortality, maternal health, malnutrition—and find no need-sensitive 
World Bank aid allocation within 27 countries. Briggs (2017) finds that World Bank and African 
Development Bank aid within 17 countries in Africa flows disproportionately to areas where more of 
the richest people live, measured by the possession of assets and the quality of housing. 
Assessing the allocation of aid requires consideration of a number of conceptual criteria and 
operational factors that may play a role in influencing within-country allocations. First, aid has been 
found to be at least partly fungible across sectors within countries (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998; 
Pack and Pack 1993).8 Insofar as aid is fungible, it may not be possible to target specific groups or affect 
the income distribution because governments tend to adjust their own spending according to the aid 
investments they receive. Likewise, the use by a donor of information on government budgetary 
allocations across administrative areas can also affect the aid patterns of the donor. Thus, a 
government may adapt its allocations in response to the aid it receives from the international donor 
community, or, the other way around, donors may allocate aid to those areas where government 
investments relative to needs are lowest. For this reason, determining the direction of causality in 
allocations is difficult. Furthermore, not all aid modalities are able to target the poor within countries. 
Budget support is typically provided to central governments and therefore tends to benefit broader 
government reform programs and institution building. As such, it cannot be easily tied to specific 
geographic areas within a country.9 
Even explicit geographic poverty targeting may follow criteria tailored to the specific parts of the 
population targeted. For instance, achieving a quick reduction in the headcount (poverty) ratio and the 
goal of narrowing the poverty gap or softening the severity of poverty imply different strategies and 
allocation patterns. While the first may lead to a concentration of resources on households living 
immediately below the poverty line to obtain the greatest bang for the dollar, the other goals may lead 
to a focus on helping all the poor equally (to narrow the poverty gap) or assigning a higher priority to 
the poorest of the poor (to soften the severity of poverty). This notwithstanding, Collier and Dollar 
(2002) report only small differences in their ideal allocation results according to the goal of generating 
more positive standard poverty measures in light of an increased weight on the poorest (headcount, 
poverty gap, and severity of poverty) in cross-country allocations, although this may not be directly 
applicable to within-country allocations. Beyond poverty rates, the targeting of geographic areas with 
higher absolute numbers of the poor is also a criterion in the effort to maximize poverty reduction. In 
this case, relatively populous areas with below-average shares of the poor may receive above-average 
resources to exert a greater impact on the large absolute number of the poor in these areas. 
Along with equity considerations, efficiency concerns may play a role in deciding on the allocation of 
development assistance. Thus, investing in areas where the expected returns to aid are low may be 
viewed as inefficient, and this may lead to geographical patterns in interventions that are different 
from those solely based on poverty (Carter 2014; Dillinger 2007). In addition, assessing the within-
country aid allocation of donors by looking at the correlations between the distributions of funds by 
donors and the location of the poor does not take into account general equilibrium effects. For example, 
energy and infrastructure projects may be located in areas with a low share of the poor, but may have 
                                                            
8 Van de Sijpe (2013), however, finds limited fungibility in the case of education and health care aid supplied 
through technical cooperation. 
9 For this reason, the assessment of geographic targeting herein does not include budget support funding and 
focuses instead on the share delivered through projects, which constitutes the lion’s share of funding in the case 
of the World Bank. 
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high general equilibrium impacts on the poor (Christiaensen, De Weerdt, and Kanbur 2017). By contrast, 
the World Bank (2009) forcefully argues that certain policies and programs, such as those related to 
land, labor, health care, education, and sanitation, should be spatially blind and provided with universal 
coverage. 
Physical access also likely influences the within-country geographical allocation of aid. Two opposing 
forces are at play in this case. First, more accessible areas will tend to perform better economically and 
typically present lower levels of poverty and need. Second, the costs of delivering aid to more remote 
areas are higher, and therefore aid may become less efficient. In addition, related political economy 
considerations among donors may affect projects in remote areas, which tend, for instance, to be less 
visible than projects in a capital city. 
On the side of the recipient government, political economy considerations may also constitute a factor 
influencing the allocation of aid within countries (Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Sosa Andrés 2017). Thus, 
Kirk (2005, 287) mentions that the distribution of World Bank aid within India “has been strongly 
conditioned by states’ political clout with the central government, owing to their ruling parties’ ties to 
the central coalition.” However, Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Sosa Andrés’s (2017) empirical analysis does 
not support this claim. Also Dreher et al. (2016) do not find evidence for favoritism in the case of World 
Bank funding in assessing the influence of the birth areas of country leaders on the amount of funding 
these areas receive. 
More generally, the allocation decisions of donors are supposed to be driven by the preferences and 
development challenges of the recipient countries. The World Bank relies on the country partnership 
framework to operationalize this approach. The framework is designed to help identify the key 
objectives and development results through which the World Bank intends to support a country in its 
efforts to reduce poverty and boost shared prosperity. In preparing a framework intervention, the 
World Bank starts from the recipient country's own vision, but aims to select a program that is aligned 
with the twin goals.10 
Within recipient countries, aid fragmentation poses important challenges. High transaction costs, 
associated with fragmented aid and the negative impact of fragmentation on bureaucratic quality, 
growth, and aid tying, have been well documented (Kimura, Mori, and Sawada 2012; Knack and 
Rahman 2007; Knack and Smets 2013; Negre and Klingebiel 2016).11 Indeed, the international 
development community has addressed this issue on numerous occasions, including the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan Declaration of 
Development Effectiveness, although arguably with limited results (Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Thiele 
2013). Nonetheless, better coordination could lead to a more effective division of labor, and this could 
potentially influence the pattern of geographical allocations across individual donors participating in 
the coordination effort. This may have already been the case in particular countries. Indeed, it is 
plausible that the World Bank may have stepped in or out of countries or subnational administrative 
areas on the basis of agreements with other key donors. Besides the effects of the degree of 
coordination in aid allocations, there are important synergies in the geographical presence of donor 
organizations and their partners in recipient countries. For example, clustering can have important 
                                                            
10 See World Bank (2014) for a comprehensive description of the objectives and the country engagement model 
underpinning the country partnership framework. 
11 However, Gehring et al. (2017) find no systematic negative effect of aid fragmentation on the effectiveness of 
aid. Furthermore, coordination alone does not guarantee results. A recent joint evaluation of 10 years of joint 
donor budget support showed mixed results in aid coordination, in part because donors may choose suboptimal 
solutions that represent the lowest common denominator among them. See EC and IEG (2015). 
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practical benefits in logistics, security, enhanced local capacities, more leverage on local authorities, 
and even a greater social awareness of aid practices across officials, communities, and beneficiaries. 
Security considerations are likely to affect the allocation of aid in countries where security risks are an 
issue. This presents a clear trade-off as areas exhibiting less security tend also to be poorer so that 
allocation patterns may positively correlate with more prosperous, safer areas. More generally, donors 
may shy away from difficult environments with weak local institutions and entrenched forms of 
poverty where the likelihood of success is low (Nunnenkamp, Öhler, and Sosa Andrés 2017). 
Imperfect local information on poverty may prevent proper targeting. While many recipient 
governments have a general idea where the poor are located, local poverty estimates may differ from 
government expectations. Given the infrequency of surveys in poorer countries and the fact that small 
area poverty mapping is a relatively new technology and requires substantial technical skill, the 
necessary information for adequate poverty targeting is limited in many developing countries. 
3. Data and methodology 
For the purpose of the examination of aid allocations and targeting effectiveness, we use data on the 
bottom 40 based on representative household surveys in 58 countries on which sufficiently 
disaggregated geospatial data are available on the bottom 40.12 More specifically, this study has relied 
on harmonized survey collections produced by the World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Global Practice.13 
These surveys contain a welfare indicator (income or consumption), a geographic identifier, and a 
sample weight for each household. The variables allow us to calculate the number of individuals 
belonging to the bottom 40 in each first-level administrative division. 
Subnational information on the locations of World Bank projects within recipient countries is mined 
from AidData.14 The database lists 1,517 World Bank investment projects approved in the sample of 
58 countries between 2005 and 2014. Taken together, these projects account for commitments of 
US$156 billion. The data set does not provide a geographic breakdown of the overall amount of project 
commitments. However, the entries in the database typically contain information on the locations 
(administrative areas) where (part of) a project takes place.15 This information is used to split total 
project commitments either equally or on a population-weighted basis across the subnational 
administrative areas in which each project is active. 
Subsequently, the share of World Bank funding—measured as commitments of investment projects—
each area receives and the share of the nationwide bottom 40 population located in each subnational 
area are calculated. Simple bivariate correlations between the two variables are calculated to assess 
                                                            
12 Not all household surveys relied on may be perfectly representative at the first administrative level. In case 
some were not, our estimates would be less precise. However, there is no particular reason to assume that they 
are biased.  
13 Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. 
14 World Bank Geocoded Research Release, Version 1.4.2 (database), AidData, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
15 Data in the GADM database are used to assign project locations to the first-level administrative areas. For a 
few countries in which the first-level administrative areas in the GADM shapefiles do not match the areas in the 
household surveys, the Global Administrative Unit Layers data set of the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations is used. Here, in the sample of 58 countries, there are 1,084 first-level administrative areas. 
For the GADM data, see GADM Database of Global Administrative Areas, Environmental Science and Policy, 
University of California, Davis, CA, http://www.gadm.org/. For the Global Administrative Unit Layers dataset, see 
GAUL (Global Administrative Unit Layers) (database), Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
Rome, http://www.fao.org/geonetwork/srv/en/metadata.show?id=12691. 
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the geographical allocation of World Bank project funding within the country.16 These initial 
calculations do not take into account other confounding factors mentioned in section 2 that may 
influence the targeting of aid. Nonetheless, high correlations are taken as an indication of effective 
geographic targeting insofar as a high proportion of resources go to those areas with a high presence 
of the bottom 40. 
To account for other factors affecting the allocation of World Bank funding within countries, in 
particular the population size of the areas examined, regressions are estimated using, as the 
dependent variable, the share of World Bank funding each area receives. Zero-inflated beta regressions 
are undertaken because beta distributions are well suited in the case of continuous variables bound 
between 0 and 1.17 Furthermore, the model is able to account for a not insignificant share of zero 
values, that is, areas that do not receive any investment project funding during the period of 
observation.18 
The estimation equation is as follows: 
ݕ௜௖ = ߚ ∗ ݈݊	ܤ40௜௖ + ߠ´ܺ + ݑ௖ + ߝ௜௖,  (1) 
where ݕ௜௖  is the share of World Bank funding going to area i in country c; ݈݊	ܤ40௜௖  is the logarithm of 
the number of persons within the country’s bottom 40 living in area i of country c; X is a set of control 
variables; ݑ௖  represents country fixed effects; and ߝ௜௖ is an idiosyncratic error term.19 Standard errors 
are clustered at the country level. 
A control is applied for population (in log) to identify the effect of the number of the bottom 40 living 
in an administrative area independent of the population size of the area. Furthermore, two variables 
are used to control for the ease of access to this area. The first is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) 
if the capital is (not) located in the area. Second, the travel time to the capital (in log) by road (with 
private transportation) from all other administrative areas is calculated from a database constructed 
from estimates gathered through Internet searches.20 Besides access, the variables are also proxies for 
the visibility of projects, which is important for donor reputations. Projects in a capital city are expected 
to be more visible than those in remote areas. In addition, conflict-related deaths per 100,000 
inhabitants are used to gauge security and the risks in administrative areas more generally. 
Government expenditures and the aid of other donors—only available in a limited sample of 15 and 
11 countries, respectively—are included in robustness tests because the World Bank may take 
                                                            
16 While the World Bank projects variable runs from 2005–14, survey data on the distribution of the bottom 40 
are scarcer and only available for some years within this period. Surveys are therefore used that are as close as 
possible to the center of the range of years, prioritizing older surveys if they are equidistant from the center to 
reflect more accurately the information available in allocation decisions and their lag relative to actual funding. 
In practice, most surveys (14) are from 2007. Other years account for fewer surveys (2011: 11, 2010: 10, 2009: 8, 
2012: 6, 2008: 5, 2005: 3, and 2006: 1). 
17 Beta distributions are characterized by high flexibility, thereby allowing varying degrees of skewness. 
18 A fractional logit model might have also been estimated (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). However, unlike a beta 
regression, it would not generate an estimate of a separate process for the probability of the value of zero. 
Nonetheless, fractional logit models have been estimated to ensure robustness. For example, see Ospina and 
Ferrari (2012) for zero-or-one-inflated beta estimates. 
19 Using the log of the number of the bottom 40 or the log of the share of the national bottom 40 living in an area 
is econometrically equivalent once one controls for country fixed effects. 
20 Depending on data availability in a particular administrative area, the estimations took official speed limits, 
recommended speeds, likely speeds on certain road types, historical average or actual speed records, and real-
time traffic information into account. 
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government budgetary allocations in administrative areas and the area-based activities of other donors 
into account in determining its own subnational resource allocations.21 
4. Results 
4.1 Correlation results 
The analysis of the geographical allocations involved in World Bank investment projects in 58 countries 
shows that, in 72 percent of the cases, the presence of World Bank–supported activities is positively 
correlated with the presence of bottom 40 populations. This is assessed by correlating the distribution 
of project funds at one administrative level below the national level with the distribution of the 
national bottom 40 population across the same subnational administrative levels.22 As shown in table 
1, 42 countries present a positive correlation. In 20 of these countries (34 percent of the total), the 
correlation is at least 0.5, while the average is 0.26. 
Table 1: Subnational Allocations, by Country, Correlation Coefficients between the Share 
of World Bank Project Funding and the Bottom 40 
 
Correlation Countries 
0.5 to 1.0 
Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Cabo Verde, Chile, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Nepal, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Uruguay, Republic of Yemen 
0 to 0.5 
Afghanistan, Angola, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mali, Niger, Peru, Philippines, 
Republic of Congo, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam 
−0.5 to 0 Belarus, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mexico, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania 
−1.0 to −0.5 Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Zambia 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
 
However, table 1 also shows that World Bank allocations in 16 countries are negatively correlated with 
the bottom 40. This finding raises questions about the allocations involved in investment projects in these 
countries that do not seem to target or reach the bottom 40. Some of these results are explained by 
substantial allocations of project resources to capital cities, whereas most of the bottom 40 live 
elsewhere. Closer inspection suggests that this is the case mostly in African countries, particularly the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Tanzania, and Zambia. In the remaining countries, a negative correlation seems not to stem from the 
overabsorption of resources by capital cities, but from the higher share of resources going, on average, 
to areas with lower shares of national bottom 40 populations. 
To illustrate, map 1 displays the geographical distribution of the bottom 40 and World Bank project 
funding across administrative areas in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. This allows a simple 
visualization of the disproportion in the shares of World Bank funding relative to the shares of the bottom 
40 in these areas. Although the correlation between the locations of the bottom 40 and of World Bank 
                                                            
21 See appendix A for definitions of the variables and data sources. 
22 In this analysis, an equal split of total project commitments is assumed across the subnational areas in which 
projects are active. The correlations in most countries tend to be somewhat higher if a population-weighed split 
of resources across subnational areas is applied (see appendix B). 
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funding is positive (0.34; see appendix B), the map clearly highlights the imperfect targeting on the 
bottom 40. Areas in the north are especially underfunded relative to their shares of the bottom 40. 
Map 1: The Distribution of the Bottom 40 and World Bank Project Funding, Lao PDR 
 
 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
 
In two countries, robustness tests at the second administrative level (districts) on which data are 
available confirm the positive correlations. In Bangladesh, the correlation (0.82) is somewhat higher in 
the districts than in the first administrative level (0.71), whereas, in Nepal, the correlation appears 
weaker (0.40) in the districts than in the first administrative level (0.92), but is still substantial. 
The geographic correlation between the location of the bottom 40 and investment projects is lowest in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (table 2). Almost half the sample is composed of countries in this region (27). The 
average correlation coefficient in these countries is 0.04, much lower than the 0.26 average across the 
entire sample. Meanwhile, at a coefficient of 0.54, the geographic correlation is highest in the 10 
countries covered in Latin America and the Caribbean. The correlations in the other regions fall between 
these values. 
Table 2: Subnational Allocations, by World Region, Correlation Coefficients between the 
Share of World Bank Funding and the Bottom 40 
 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific. ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia. LAC = Latin American and the 
Caribbean. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. SAR = South Asia. SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Region Countries, number 
Country 
areas, 
number 
Average areas 
per country 
Correlation coefficients 
Simple 
average 
Weighted average by 
country population 
Weighted average by 
country commitments 
SSA 27 437 16 0.04 0.04 0.10 
EAP 5 144 29 0.37 0.41 0.30 
ECA 8 148 19 0.39 0.12 0.20 
LAC 10 193 19 0.54 0.48 0.66 
MENA 2 39 20 0.37 0.31 0.37 
SAR 6 123 21 0.49 0.71 0.69 
World 58 1,084 19 0.26 0.43 0.40 
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The regional ranking changes substantially if the correlations are weighted by national population or the 
amount of project funding allocated to each country. The population-weighted average in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is dragged downward by populous Mexico, which presents a slightly negative 
correlation coefficient (−0.04). The region drops to second position in the two weighted lists (see table 
2). South Asia’s targeting proves far better when weighted by either population or allocations thanks to 
the very high correlations shown in Bangladesh (0.86) and India (0.73). The Russian Federation (0.03) is 
mostly responsible for a large drop in the weighted average coefficients for Europe and Central Asia. 
Figure 1 displays a more disaggregated view of the distribution of the values of the correlation 
coefficients both for the entire sample (panel a) and for each region (panel b). This reveals mostly positive 
values in the correlation coefficients across the sample and a broadly uniform distribution in the case of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, ranging from −0.7 to 0.9.23 
Figure 1: Histograms of Correlation Coefficients 
 
a. For the entire sample 
 
 
b. For each world region 
 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release, (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacific. ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia. LAC = Latin American and the 
Caribbean. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. SAR = South Asia. SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
                                                            
23 Appendix C plots, for the overall sample of 58 countries, the share of World Bank resources going to each 
subnational area against the share of the national bottom 40 population in the area. The simple correlation of 
0.58 between these two variables is significant at 1 percent. The red line represents the 45-degree line. The more 
distant points are from the 45-degree line, the larger the difference between the aid share allocated to an area 
and the share of the national bottom 40 living in the area. 
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These results may be interpreted only cautiously as an indicator that, at least at the first administrative 
level, allocation patterns are sensitive to the presence of the bottom 40 and strongly so in a large share 
of the country sample. In particular, the presence of the bottom 40 is typically correlated with the size of 
the population in an administrative area. Hence, a high correlation may indicate that World Bank project 
funding is simply concentrated in populous areas rather than explicitly targeted on the bottom 40. 
4.2 Robust regression results 
Table 3 presents the results of zero-inflated beta regressions in which the share of World Bank funding 
an administrative area receives is the dependent variable. Country fixed effects are included to assess 
within-country correlations between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding. The estimates in column 
(1) do not include any control variables and are therefore analogous to the correlation coefficients 
described above. Indeed, the positive and significant coefficient of the bottom 40 is in line with the 
positive correlations between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding found in most countries. The 
results show that World Bank funding is predominantly allocated to the subnational administrative 
areas in which most of the bottom 40 reside. In quantitative terms, an increase in the number of the 
bottom 40 by 10 percent leads, on average, to an increase in the share of World Bank funding by 
0.0012.24 The effect is rather small because it constitutes only 2.2 percent of the mean of the 
dependent variable (0.054). 
Table 3: Zero-Inflated Beta Regressions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln bottom 40 0.246*** −0.226*** −0.126** −0.130** 
(0.035) (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) 
Ln population 0.673*** 0.524*** 0.536*** 
  (0.079) (0.087) (0.085) 
Capital   0.317* 0.376*** 
   (0.176) (0.137) 
Ln travel time   −0.014  
   (0.022)  
Conflict-related deaths   −0.00003  
   (0.00030)  
Number of countries 58 58 58 58 
Number of observations, areas 1,081 1,081 1,056 1,081 
Note: The dependent variable is the share of World Bank funding an administrative area receives. Country fixed 
effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1 
 
In column (2), population is included as a control variable. As expected, the coefficient on population 
turns out to be significant and positive. The coefficient on the bottom 40 switches sign and becomes 
significantly negative.25 The correlation between the bottom 40 and population conditional on the 
country fixed effects is 0.83. The results clearly show that more World Bank funding is allocated to 
areas with larger populations, which thus also tend to comprise larger shares of the bottom 40. If one 
controls for population, a higher number of the bottom 40 becomes associated with less World Bank 
funding. Quantitatively, an increase in the number of the bottom 40 by 10 percent leads, on average, 
to a decrease in the share of World Bank funding by 0.0011 (2.0 percent of the mean). This finding 
                                                            
24 Average marginal effects are calculated using Stata’s margins command. 
25 The sign switch is visually presented in appendix D, which shows the partial residual plots with respect to the 
bottom 40 for linear regressions with and without controlling for population, which are analogous to the zero-
inflated beta estimations in columns (1) and (2) of table 3. 
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shows that the subnational allocation of World Bank project funding is not oriented toward poorer 
areas within countries in terms of the share of the bottom 40 in the population of the areas because 
these areas receive, on average, less funding from the World Bank. 
The estimates in column (3) add three more control variables: a dummy variable equal to 1 if the capital 
city is located in the respective area, the estimated travel time from the other administrative areas to 
the capital, and the number of conflict-related deaths. The only significant one among these is the 
dummy variable for the capital city. The finding shows that areas with a capital city tend to receive a 
higher share of World Bank funding independently of the size of the population or the number of the 
bottom 40. 
In column (4), the insignificant variables—travel time and conflict-related deaths—are excluded. The 
significance level of the capital area increases from 10 percent in column (3) to 1 percent in column 
(4).26 In quantitative terms, the fact that an area encompasses the capital city raises the share of World 
Bank funding the area receives by an average 0.018 (33.7 percent of the mean). This substantial effect 
indicates that donors are inclined to work in capital cities. Efficiency or visibility considerations may 
play a role (see section 2). 
Table 4 shows the results across world regions.27 In columns (1)–(5), only the bottom 40 variable is 
included, whereas the estimates in columns (6)–(10) add population and the capital area as control 
variables. The estimates with only the bottom 40 variable show that the coefficient on the bottom 40 
is, although positive and significant at the 5 percent level, substantially smaller in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa than in other regions.28 The inclusion of the two control variables renders the difference 
even more striking. While the coefficient on the bottom 40 is not significant in the other regions, it is 
significant at the 1 percent level and negative in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, the negative and significant 
coefficient in columns (3) and (4) of table 3 appear to be solely driven by the subnational allocation of 
World Bank project funding in Sub-Saharan Africa. There, poorer subnational areas appear to receive 
less project funding, whereas this is apparently not the case in the other world regions.29 
Table 4: Zero-Inflated Beta Regressions, by World Region 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  SSA EAP ECA LAC SAR SSA EAP ECA LAC SAR 
Ln bottom 40 0.095** 0.332*** 0.516*** 0.376*** 0.334*** −0.214*** 0.207 0.024 0.256 −0.097 
 (0.040) (0.067) (0.109) (0.062) (0.046) (0.058) (0.185) (0.275) (0.166) (0.126) 
Ln population      0.628*** 0.187 0.563* 0.096 0.625*** 
      (0.078) (0.217) (0.300) (0.210) (0.180) 
Capital      0.588*** 0.663 −0.231 0.356 0.395** 
      (0.143) (0.569) (0.274) (0.367) (0.189) 
Number of countries 27 5 8 10 6 27 5 8 10 6 
Observations, number 436 144 148 193 121 436 144 148 193 121 
Note: The dependent variable is the share of World Bank funding a region receives. Country fixed effects are 
included in all estimations. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. EAP = East Asia and Pacific. ECA = 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. LAC = Latin American and the Caribbean. SAR = South Asia. SSA = Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1 
 
                                                            
26 Apart from efficiency gains because of fewer explanatory variables, the number of observations (areas) rose 
relative to column (3) because the data on estimated travel times to the capital are not available for all areas. 
27 Standard errors are not clustered in these regressions because of the relatively small number of clusters 
(countries). Robust standard errors are estimated, however. 
28 The significance level of the coefficient is 1 percent in all other world regions. The estimates on the Middle East 
and North Africa are not included because only two countries (with 39 subnational areas) in that region are 
included in the sample. 
29 An additional result is that the coefficient on the capital area is only significant in South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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Table 5 specifically highlights two broad categories of projects: those that are spatially blind, and those 
that are not spatially blind. Education and health care projects should be spatially blind, according to 
the World Bank (2009), because of the goal of universal coverage in these sectors. In transportation, 
energy, and mining projects, subnational allocation decisions depend on practical considerations such 
as the availability of natural waterways or raw materials. The results of the regressions without 
population in columns (1) and (4) indicate that the coefficients for the two categories of projects are 
virtually the same size. This means that funding for education and health care projects is not 
disproportionally allocated to areas with higher numbers of the bottom 40 relative to the funding for 
transportation, energy, and mining projects. 
However, as columns (2) and (5) show, a different picture emerges after controls are applied for 
population and the capital area. While the coefficient on the bottom 40 is not significant in the case of 
education and health care projects, it becomes negative and significant at the 10 percent level in 
transportation, energy, and mining projects. The negative coefficients of such projects may be 
explained by general equilibrium effects because projects located in areas with a smaller share of the 
poor may still exert high general equilibrium impacts on the poor. Moreover, population size and the 
dummy variable for capital area are only significantly positive in the case of transportation, energy, 
and mining projects. It appears that these types of projects are predominantly located in the capital 
area and in other populous areas of the countries. The estimates in column (3) show some evidence 
that education and health care projects tend to be located in more remote areas. According to column 
(6), transportation, energy, and mining projects appear, meanwhile, to be located less frequently in 
conflict-affected areas. 
Table 5: Zero-Inflated Beta Regressions, Education and Health versus Transportation, 
Energy, and Mining 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Education and health projects Transportation, energy and mining projects 
Ln bottom 40 0.157*** 0.090 0.064 0.157*** −0.113* −0.123* 
 (0.029) (0.066) (0.066) (0.041) (0.065) (0.070) 
Ln population  0.094 0.135*  0.419*** 0.415*** 
  (0.079) (0.079)  (0.084) (0.087) 
Capital  −0.094 0.099  0.352** 0.309 
  (0.170) (0.189)  (0.171) (0.199) 
Ln travel time   0.044*   −0.011 
   (0.023)   (0.028) 
Conflict-related deaths   −0.0003   −0.001** 
   (0.0003)   (0.0002) 
Number of countries 51 51 51 54 54 54 
Number of observations, areas 964 964 946 1,000 1,000 975 
Note: Only countries with projects in the respective sectors are included. Country fixed effects are included in all 
estimations. Standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1 
 
Table 6 includes public expenditure by recipient governments and the aid of other donors as additional 
control variables. The number of countries is reduced to 15 (public expenditure) and 11 (aid from other 
donors) because of data availability constraints. This affects the significance levels of the bottom 40 
variable, and the variable even becomes insignificant in some cases. The analysis shows that public 
expenditure by national governments is insignificant, while there is a positive and significant effect at 
the 1 percent level of the aid of other donors. Hence, there is no evidence of donor coordination. On 
the contrary, the analysis shows evidence of area clustering by the World Bank and the other donors. 
The conformity in location choices may yield important benefits for donor organizations linked to 
logistics, security, and reputation (see section 2). 
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Table 6: Zero-Inflated Beta Regressions, Public Expenditure and the Aid of Other Donors 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln bottom 40 0.126* −0.094 −0.041 0.016 −0.078 −0.372*** −0.210* −0.217** 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.080) (0.074) (0.082) (0.105) (0.109) (0.106) 
Ln population  0.431*** 0.373*** 0.276***  0.767*** 0.462*** 0.453*** 
  (0.116) (0.107) (0.082)  (0.137) (0.162) (0.172) 
Capital   0.241* −0.132   0.872*** 1.271*** 
   (0.142) (0.207)   (0.279) (0.428) 
Ln travel time    −0.099*    0.073 
    (0.054)    (0.066) 
Conflict-related deaths    0.00056    −0.001 
    (0.00008)    (0.001) 
Ln public expenditure 0.156 −0.020 −0.044 −0.067     
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.108) (0.102)     
Ln aid of other donors     0.218*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.146*** 
     (0.057) (0.038) (0.039) (0.051) 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 11 11 11 11 
Number of observations, areas 320 320 320 313 267 267 267 262 
Note: Country fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered at the country level are shown 
in parentheses. 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1 
 
In a series of robustness tests, the observations are weighted in various ways; certain groups of 
countries are excluded; the dependent variable is altered; and the estimation method is changed.30 In 
a first instance, the observations are weighted so that each country, rather than each administrative 
area, has the same weight in the regressions. In the second, countries with five or fewer first-level 
administrative areas are excluded from the regressions (five countries). In the third, countries in which 
only five or fewer World Bank projects have been conducted over 1995–2004 are excluded (six 
countries). In the fourth, the construction of the dependent variable is altered, and the subnational 
administrative areas are weighted by population (rather than equally) in splitting total project 
commitments across the areas in which a project is active. In the fifth, the amount of World Bank 
funding is used as the dependent variable instead of the share of funding an area receives, and a 
Poisson regression model is estimated. In the last, a fractional logit model is estimated instead of a 
zero-inflated beta model. (Both are valid estimation methods in the case of percentage scaled 
dependent variables.) The results remain qualitatively the same as the results shown in table 3 except 
that the coefficient on the dummy variable for the capital area becomes insignificant in some cases. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Beyond the World Bank and United Nations goals of poverty reduction, poverty reduction is often at 
the top of the priorities announced by donors. Thus, it might be expected that the within-country 
geographical distribution of donor projects and programs should bear a certain correlation with the 
physical location of the poor. This should apply to the geographic presence of the poor both in absolute 
numbers and in relative terms, that is, for example, the share of the poor in the population of an 
administrative area. 
                                                            
30 Appendix E shows the regression results if population and the dummy variable for capital areas are used as 
controls. 
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This paper proposes a new geographic targeting indicator and a related methodology to assess the 
within-country aid allocations of donors by correlating the geographical distribution of donor funding 
within countries with the geographical distribution of the bottom 40. 
Applying this methodology to World Bank project funding, the correlation analysis indicates that, of 
the 58 countries in the sample, 42 show a positive correlation between the shares of the bottom 40 
and World Bank funding, and almost half of the countries show a correlation above 0.5.31 Slightly more 
than a quarter of the countries in the total sample, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative 
correlation. Indeed, the geographic correlation between the bottom 40 and World Bank investment 
funding is lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average correlation coefficient of almost 0, which is 
significantly lower relative to the entire sample. This result can be explained in the case of many 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa by the substantial allocation of project resources to the capital, whereas 
most of the bottom 40 live elsewhere. 
The presence of the bottom 40 is, however, typically correlated with the size of the population in an 
administrative area. The regression analysis shows that, once one controls for population, the 
correlation between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding switches sign and becomes significant and 
negative on average. This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa because the correlation is 
insignificant in other world regions. Hence, the significant and positive correlation in the estimates 
without controls for population indicates that World Bank project funding is concentrated in areas in 
which more people live, including the bottom 40, rather than in poorer areas. A regression analysis on 
a subsample of 11 countries shows that the subnational allocations of the World Bank and other donors 
are positively correlated. This suggests that the World Bank and other donors cluster their aid across 
subnational areas rather than engaging in complementary coordination. 
Several factors may explain the imperfect targeting of aid on the poorest. In the regression analyses, 
controls are applied for remoteness, conflict, and complementarity with domestic and other external 
financing. Other considerations that are more difficult to measure quantitatively are worth reiterating. 
First, domestic political economy considerations and recipient country preferences may affect the 
allocation of development aid. Second, general equilibrium effects may be at play if the returns to 
poverty reduction are higher in nonpoor areas.32 Third, the lack of information on where the poor are 
located may prevent proper targeting. 
Given that the interpretation of low (partial) correlations may still be ambiguous, such findings may be 
useful as an entry point for further analysis rather than as a negative assessment. Nonetheless, given 
the increasing availability of poverty and aid data associated with small area maps, the World Bank 
ought to monitor more closely the extent to which the geographical distribution of project funding and 
the residence of the bottom 40 align.33 Such an exercise has the potential to enhance substantially the 
efficiency of increasingly scarce development funds and help maximize the poverty-reducing effects of 
development assistance. 
Similar studies of other development banks and large bilateral donor agencies aimed not only at 
investigating spatial poverty targeting, but also at other development goals would thus be welcome. 
                                                            
31 The generally positive results are supported by two cases of countries on which the correlation analysis was 
conducted at the second administrative level (districts), in addition to the analysis at the first administrative level. 
The results show that correlations remain positive. 
32 The finding that education and health care projects perform better than energy, mining, and transportation 
projects in within-country allocations is consistent with the fact that the World Bank takes into account general 
equilibrium effects. 
33 The results of this paper could serve as a baseline because the analysis covers projects approved between 2005 
and 2014. The recent Independent Evaluation Group report (IEG 2017) makes this recommendation based on the 
research that is described in this paper and that provided input into that report. 
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Definition Source 
World Bank 
funding 
Total commitments of investment projects 
of the World Bank in U.S. dollars split 
equally (or population weighted) across the 
subnational first-level administrative areas 
in which a project has been active; 2005–14 
AidData 
World Bank Geocoded Research 
Release, (database), AidData, 
College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, VA (accessed 
November 23, 2016), 
http://aiddata.org/data/world-
bank-geocoded-research-release-
level-1-v1-4-2 
Share of World 
Bank funding 
Share of World Bank project funding a 
subnational administrative area receives 
AidData 
Share of the 
bottom 40 
Share of the national bottom 40 population 
living in an administrative area; data from 
surveys within the 2005–14 period 
Global Poverty Monitoring 
Source: Global Monitoring 
Database (internal database), 
Poverty and Equity Global 
Practice, World Bank, 
Washington, DC (accessed 
December 2016–January 2017) 
Ln bottom 40 Number of the national bottom 40 
population living in an area (in log) 
Global Poverty Monitoring 
Ln population Number of people living in an area (in log) Global Poverty Monitoring 
Capital area Dummy variable equal to one (zero) if the 
capital of the country is (not) located in the 
area 
Internet searches 
Ln travel time Estimated road travel time with private 
transportation from each subnational area 
to the respective capital in minutes (in log) 
Internet searches 
Conflict-related 
deaths 
Number of conflict-related deaths in an 
area (per 100,000 inhabitants); 2005–14 
UCDP 
UCDP (Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program) (database), Department 
of Peace and Conflict Research, 
Uppsala University, Uppsala, 
Sweden (accessed June 20, 2017), 
http://ucdp.uu.se/?id=1) 
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ 
Ln public 
expenditure 
Subnational public expenditure (in log); 
2005–14 or subperiods 
Boost 
Open Budgets Portal: Boost 
(database), World Bank, 
Washington, DC (accessed June 
20, 2017), 
http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/c
ountry 
Ln aid of other 
donors 
Aid of other donors (in log); 2005-2014 
(expect in the case of Senegal for which the 
period covered is 2005-2012) 
AidData 
http://aiddata.org/subnational-
geospatial-research-datasets 
(accessed: September 28th, 2017) 
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Appendix B: Subnational Allocations, Correlation Coefficients, by Country 
Country Administrative areas, number 
Correlation coefficients 
Project locations equally weighted Project locations weighted by population 
Afghanistan 34 0.22 0.15 
Angola 18 0.20 0.37 
Armenia 11 0.78 0.95 
Bangladesh 7 0.71 0.82 
Belarus 7 −0.27 −0.44 
Bhutan 20 0.07 0.13 
Bolivia 9 0.85 0.95 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 0.96 0.98 
Brazil 27 0.75 0.77 
Burkina Faso 13 0.09 0.09 
Burundi 17 −0.26 −0.20 
Cameroon 10 0.23 0.37 
Cabo Verde 22 0.62 0.56 
Chad 20 0.02 0.05 
Chile 13 0.89 0.97 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 11 −0.16 0.03 
Congo, Rep. 12 0.40 0.31 
Ecuador 22 0.44 0.46 
El Salvador 14 0.57 0.91 
Ethiopia 11 0.92 0.97 
Georgia 10 −0.21 0.18 
Ghana 10 −0.24 −0.11 
Guatemala 22 0.31 0.87 
Guinea 8 −0.60 −0.37 
Guinea-Bissau 9 −0.01 0.06 
Haiti 10 0.46 0.78 
India 35 0.73 0.86 
Indonesia 33 0.64 0.92 
Iraq 18 0.13 0.45 
Kenya 8 0.43 0.81 
Kyrgyz Republic 8 0.85 0.96 
Lao PDR 18 0.34 0.62 
Lesotho 10 0.59 0.81 
Madagascar 6 0.55 0.60 
Mali 9 0.32 0.46 
Mauritania 13 0.69 0.72 
Mexico 32 −0.04 0.18 
Mozambique 11 −0.35 0.18 
Nepal 5 0.92 0.99 
Niger 8 0.36 0.44 
Nigeria 37 −0.05 0.16 
Peru 25 0.31 0.45 
Philippines 17 0.09 0.26 
Russian Federation 77 0.03 0.10 
Rwanda 5 −0.57 −0.22 
Senegal 14 −0.34 −0.34 
Sierra Leone 4 −0.63 −0.65 
South Africa 9 −0.17 0.18 
Sri Lanka 22 0.28 0.51 
Tajikistan 5 0.80 0.86 
Tanzania 21 −0.39 −0.17 
Timor-Leste 13 0.67 0.63 
Uganda 112 0.09 0.06 
Ukraine 27 0.18 0.32 
Uruguay 19 0.90 0.97 
Vietnam 63 0.11 0.28 
Yemen, Rep. 21 0.60 0.87 
Zambia 9 −0.54 −0.43 
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Appendix C: World Bank Project Funding versus Bottom 40 Share, Subnational Areas, 2005–14 
 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release, (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
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Appendix D: Partial Residual Plots, Bottom 40, Linear Regressions 
 
a. Without controlling for population 
  
b. Controlling for population 
 
Source: Estimates based on Global Monitoring Database (internal database), Poverty and Equity Global Practice, 
World Bank, Washington, DC; World Bank Geocoded Research Release, (database), AidData, College of William 
and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, http://aiddata.org/data/world-bank-geocoded-research-release-level-1-v1-4-2. 
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Appendix E: Robustness Tests 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln bottom 40 −0.193*** −0.115* −0.145** −0.175*** −0.185** −0.174** 
 (0.065) (0.061) (0.057) (0.060) (0.075) (0.078) 
Ln population 0.672*** 0.489*** 0.578*** 1.108*** 0.738*** 0.691*** 
 (0.120) (0.083) (0.084) (0.095) (0.118) (0.103) 
Capital 0.255* 0.436*** 0.362*** 0.505*** −0.047 0.384** 
 (0.151) (0.140) (0.130) (0.155) (0.133) (0.163) 
Observations 1,081 1,059 979 1,081 1,081 1,081 
Note: Country fixed effects are included in all estimations. Standard errors clustered at the country level are shown 
in parentheses. 
***p < .01 **p < .05 *p < .1 
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